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For most people November 18, 2005 was just another
Friday, but for Jenifer and Angelo Magliocco, it was a day they
would remember for the rest of their lives. At 2:43 pm, blue-eyed
t J.D. from University at Buffalo Law School, SUNY; B.S. chemistry and
economics from Dickinson College.
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Angelo James was introduced to the world, weighing seven pounds
and measuring almost twenty one inches long. Tears of joy filled
the eyes of the Maglioccos when Angelo James cried for the first
time. By Sunday, Dr. Esposito, the family's pediatrician, cleared
Angelo James to go home to his safari themed nursery. The
Maglioccos went through the process of changing, feeding, and
bathing Angelo James and loved every minute of being new
parents. The next few weeks were amazing for the Magliocco
family, but fear grew when they noticed that Angelo James seemed
extremely calm and relaxed compared to other newborns. The
Maglioccos called Dr. Esposito for reassurance that Angelo James
was fine. On December 18, one month after his birth, Angelo
James was back in a hospital, but this time there was no reason to
celebrate. Shortly thereafter, the Maglioccos received devastating
news. There was a strong possibility that Angelo James suffered
from Spinal Muscular Atrophy ("SMA"), a fatal disease. Three
weeks later, on their way to see another physician, Jenifer received
a phone call confirming her worst fears, the DNA tests were
positive for SMA Type 1. Angelo James passed away after eight
short weeks of life.'
In 2006, National Public Radio reported that the
Maglioccos, with the help of a Yale University geneticist and a
technique known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis ("PGD"),
were attempting to have a child free of SMA. 2
INTRODUCTION
The late 1970s saw the first child born from in vitro
fertilization ("IVF").3 About ten years later, a procedure known as
1 This is a true story. The Magliocco family experienced the joy of life and the
pain of death within a short two-month period. Angelo's Story, THE ANGELO
JAMES
MAGLIOCCO FOUNDATION,
http://www.angelojamesmagliocco.org/
angelosstory.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
2 Joe Palca, Screening Embryos for Disease, NPR.org, (Dec. 20, 2006),
http://npr.org/templates/story.php?storyld=6653837.
3 Peggy Orenstein, The Way We Live Now: In Vitro We Trust, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (July 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/
20wwln-lede-t.html.
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PGD 4 that analyzed the genetic make-up of two and one half day
pre-embryos 5 created through IVF before implantation in utero,6
was allowing parents to make critical decisions about the futures of
their unborn children.7 Within twenty five years, the completion of
the Human Genome Project has mapped over three billion base
pairs of DNA and more than 1,400 disease genes within the human
body with an accuracy of 99.9%.8 As scientists uncover new areas

of genetic understanding within the human genome, as it pertains
to disease and non-disease genes, legislatures will face increased
pressure to pass laws regarding the ethical dilemmas associated
with PGD. The combination of all three scientific discoveries has
led to increased concern for a future filled with assisted
reproductive technology ("ART") and overzealous parents wanting
only the best for their child at any cost.
This paper begins by analyzing the ethical considerations
involved in a parent's choice for PGD in the process of
procreation. This paper then focuses on a line of Supreme Court
cases to analyze whether a right to autonomous choice is
recognized by the Constitution and if it can be asserted as a
protected liberty. Section II looks at the current field of PGD
4 For

the purpose of this paper, the term PGD will encompass preimplantation
genetic diagnosis, preimplantation genetic screening ("PGS"), and
preimplantation genetic screening and selection ("PGSS"). Although authors
have suggested definitions for all three, this paper does not attempt to draw a
distinction.
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee
Supreme Court determined that in the case before them the "frozen embryos" of
four-to-eight-cells were to be referred to as "pre-embryos" rather than
"embryos."
' See Donrich W. Jordaan, PreimplantationGeneticScreening andSelection: An
EthicalAnalysis, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 586, 586-87 (2003).
7 J. A. Robertson, Extending PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis:Medical and
Non-Medical Uses, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 213, 213 (2003), available at
http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/29/4/213.
8 Nat'l Inst. of Health News, International Consortium Completes Human
Genome Project (Apr. 14, 2003, 1:00 PM), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/
apr2003/nhgri- 14.htm.
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regulation to see how the ethical question of regulation versus
choice is handled by both international nations as well as the
United States. Section III examines the bioethical principles of a
parent's autonomous choice and the governmental interest in
promoting justice through regulation regarding PGD. Next,
hypothetical situations where one bioethical principle is chosen
over another are presented and subsequently rejected as unethical
in either circumstance. Section IV takes the stance that the
combination of a central government agency protecting safety and
efficacy and professional organizations weighing autonomy and
justice for PGD creates an ethical solution suitable for the United
States. Finally, this paper argues that both bioethical principles of
autonomy and justice must be taken into consideration with the
creation of governmental regulation for PGD because balancing
these principles is the best solution to creating the most ethical
result.
When determining whether governmental regulation for
PGD is ethical, this paper relies on the questions: What is the
issue? Who are we protecting and how are they perceived? What
ethical principles apply? Are the actions taken ethical? Is the action
ethically based on the balancing of applicable principles? And if
the action were unethical, what would make it ethical?
This Author notes that the analysis of the third bioethical
principle, beneficence,1o is not left out of this paper because of a
lack of oversight, but because the concepts of autonomy and
justice take center stage. Realistically speaking, questions of
parental intent, actions of the physician, and the instituted
regulations all raise valid concerns of beneficence toward one

9 This paper relies on class discussion of bioethical principles with Professor

Ruqaiijah A. Yearby.
See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 165-214 (5th ed. 2001). If the bioethical principle of
beneficence was applied, the appropriate topics would include: 1) actions taken
by the parents to benefit their child, 2) actions taken by the physicians to benefit
the parents and the child, and 3) the actions of the government taken to benefit
all three. Id.
10
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another and the future child." But an assumption that all
participants are acting in the best interests of one another is
necessary in order to focus on what this Author believes is most
essential- autonomy and justice. 12 This paper focuses on a parent's
choice to use PGD and the bioethical principles a government must
address when considering regulation, rather than the future child.
I.

PGD AND AUTONOMOUS PROCREATION

Determining whether a parent's choice for PGD is ethical
relies heavily on the weight given to their autonomous choices. 13
An autonomous choice focuses on the actual self-governance of
decisions rather than the individual's capacity to make those
decisions.14 A person can only make an autonomous choice when
he is acting intentionally with understanding and is substantially
free from controlling influences.' 5 Although an action is either
intentional or not, the understanding and influences that determine
an autonomous action can be measured in varying degrees.' 6 it is
almost impossible to say that a person has complete understanding
or is without controlling influences when making a decision, but
marking a point on the spectrum of understanding and influence
can help to determine the level of autonomy behind a choice made
and whether that action can be deemed ethical.' 7
Do society's laws shape our moral principles or do our
moral principles shape society's laws? This Author suggests that
although the legality of our actions does not always necessarily
correspond to whether our actions are ethical, it is a good starting
point for trying to uncover how today's society views morality and
the ethical principles of autonomy and justice. Therefore, this
" See id.

See
See
14 See
15
See
12

id.
id. at 121.
id
id at 123.
16 See id.
1 See id.
13
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paper begins with a closer look at whether the Supreme Court of
the United States has interpreted a protected fundamental right for
PGD.
A. Is There a Protected Fundamental Right for
PGD?
"Ultimately, decisions about how to use or not use
genomics in human reproduction will be
determined, not by biological necessity or
evolutionary theory, but by how those uses fit into
the fabric of rights and interests of individual and
social choice and responsibility that particular
societiesrecognize."I8
-JohnA. Robertson
What if the United States has yet to directly address the
rights and interests that genomic uses in human reproduction will
raise? What then is the best gauge for predicting where our
individual interests will lie on society's spectrum of protected
rights in the coming age of "reprogenetics"? 19 Two authors, John
A. Robertson and Dov Fox, suggest that it is plausible to
extrapolate a constitutionally protected right that might include
procreative liberty,2 0 and genetic engineering 2 1 in reproduction
within the United States from a line of past Supreme Court cases.
In Griswoldv. Connecticut,22 Justice Douglas delivered the
Court's opinion regarding whether a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use and aiding and abetting the use of
8 John

A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty in the Eraof Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. &
MED. 439, 452 (2003).
19Id. at 481 (reprogenetics means the use of genetics in reproduction).
See id. at 452-55. "Procreative liberty is best understood as a liberty or claimright to decide whether or not to reproduce. As such, it has two independently
justified aspects: the liberty to avoid having offspring and the liberty to have
offspring." Id. at 447.
21 Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the
EgalitarianEthos, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 577-79 (2007).
22 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20
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contraceptives was unconstitutional.23 The Court held that the
Connecticut statute was unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Justice Goldberg drew
upon prior Court decisions in his concurrence, to interpret that the
Due Process Clause "protects those liberties that are 'so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,' such as marital privacy.25 In regards to prohibiting
the use of contraceptives, Justice Goldberg stated that it would
astonish him if "personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
does not include protection against such totalitarian limitation of
family size, . . ." which can be regarded under the concept of

marital privacy.2 6 Although Griswold does not directly address
whether a fundamental right exists for a parent to make an
autonomous choice regarding non-coital reproduction, the case
creates a framework upon which to build a procreative right.
In Eisenstadtv. Baird,27 Justice Brennan delivered Court's
opinion on the issue of whether a Massachusetts law prohibiting
the use or distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals
was unconstitutional. 28 The Court held that the Massachusetts law
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and was therefore unconstitutional. 29 The Court
revisited the Griswold decision when discussing the protection of
the right of privacy and made the statement that "[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
Id. at 480.
See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
25 Id at 487 (quoting Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105
(1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (regarding a
5th amendment violation)).
26 Id. at 497.
27 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
28 Id. at 446-47.
29 Id. at 454-55.
23

24
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whether to bear or beget a child."30 Fox notes that the Court's
positions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Casey culminate in the
conclusion that the "fundamental right to make childbearing
decisions free from state interference" is a matter of due process.3 1
In Roe v. Wade,32 Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion
of the Court regarding whether a Texas statute that criminalized
abortion was unconstitutional. The Court held that the criminal
abortion statute in Texas, and others like it, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore
unconstitutional.34 The Court recognized certain instances
regarding a "right of personal privacy" of an individual where
there are "zones of privacy [that do] exist under the
Constitution."3 5 The Court went on to say that case history has
established that the protected privacy right extends to the activities
of procreation and child rearing.36 However, the Court held that
although a woman does have a privacy right related to pregnancy
and the decision to terminate, that right is not absolute; upon a
showing of a 'compelling state interest,' the State may limit those
rights.37 An important distinction was drawn between a pregnant
woman's privacy right and the privacy aspects of other rights such
as procreation, due to the involvement of a third party (the fetus)
during pregnancy.38 Arguably, the Court has placed a lower burden

30

Id. at 453.

31 Fox,

supranote 21, at 576. Fox notes that the Casey Court draws from dictum
of Eisenstadt to establish a substantive due process right that protects personal
privacy.
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33 See id. at 116.
34 See id at 164.
5 Id.

at 152.

See id. at 152-53 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)
(procreation); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child
rearing)).
37
See id at 154-55 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969)).
38 See id. at
159.
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on the State to show an interest necessary to limit a pregnant
woman's right to privacy compared to her right to procreate. 39
In Casey v. PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania,40 Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court regarding the constitutionality of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.41 Casey was an
opportunity for the Court to revisit and redraw the boundaries for
the circumstances under which the State could limit the
fundamental right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy as
decided in Roe v. Wade.42 The Court determined that the main
holding of Roe should be kept intact but changed the "rigid
trimester framework" to an "undue burden analysis" - balancing
the State's interest to preserve and promote life against a woman's
constitutionally protected rights.4 3 Although the standard seems to
have lessened from a compelling State interest to a showing of
undue burden, the Court did note that the constitutional protection
to personal decisions, such as procreation, family relationships,
and child rearing, "involv[e] the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." 44
In Lawrence v. Texas,45 Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court regarding the constitutionality of a Texas
statute criminalizing the intimate sexual conduct of two members of
the same sex.46 Overruling it's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,47
39 See id. ("The situation [of pregnancy] therefore is inherently different from
marital intimacy, . . . or procreation , . . . with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, . .

. [and] Skinner ... were respectively concerned.").
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41 Id. at 843-45.
42 See id. at
853.
4 Id. at 878-79.
44
Id. at 851.
45 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
46 Id. at 562.
47 See id. at 578-79.
40
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the Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the Texas statutes were unconstitutional for violating
the privacy liberty of individuals in making a decision about their
sexual practices. Both Fox and Robertson identify Lawrence as the
Court's expansion of protected privacy rights associated with
personal choices considered extremely intimate.
Therefore,
Lawrence creates the possibility of a broader interpretation into
reproductive rights involving genetics in ART.4 8
In Gonzales v. Carhart,49 Justice Kennedy delivered the
Court's opinion regarding the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003.50 The Court held that the Act's
prohibition of the "intact" dilation and evacuation ("D & E")
procedure, used for pre-viability second trimester abortions, was
constitutional because it was neither vague nor did it place an
undue burden on women.5 The Court further stated that "[t]he
government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show
us profound respect for the life within the woman," seemingly
limiting certain actions, such as "intact" D & E which might
devalue that respect.52 Although the Court's decision in Gonzales
prohibits a certain type of abortion, the Court recognized that the
constitutional right for a woman to terminate a pregnancy is still
available in other forms.53
B. Varying Opinions
An individual's actions regarding his "procreative
liberty's" constitutional protection against state interference
"depend upon whether they were centrally or intimately connected
with reproductive decision-making." 54 Robertson suggests that the
closer the actions of an individual are linked to the fundamental
right to reproduce, the further the constitutional presumption of
See Fox, supranote 21, at 577; Robertson, supranote 18, at 454-55.
49 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
50
See id at 132.
51
See id. at 168.
52 Id. at 157.
53 See id. at 181-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54 Robertson, supranote 18, at 454.
48
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protection against state interference will extend under a concept of
procreative liberty.5 5 However, Robertson notes that this
constitutionally extended presumption will only go as far as the
actions are viewed as necessary to reproduction and no great harms
are imposed on others.56
Relying on the interpretation of Lawrence as an indication
that the Supreme Court will broaden the childbearing jurisprudence,
Fox suggests possible ways in which the Supreme Court might find
a protected liberty interest in genetic reproduction. The first
approach, an autonomy defense, reads the dictum of Casey as
recognizing that the autonomous choices an individual makes
throughout his lifetime are so personal that he inherently demands
protection as a fundamental right. 8 One could argue that within
reproduction is the liberty to use genetics in ART.59
The second approach, an analogical defense, relies on the
Washington v. Glucksberg 0 analysis of an asserted right's
proximity to other fundamental rights that have already been
established.61 Fox argues that under safe conditions it is reasonable
to draw a parallel between the affects of a parent's choice in early
child development after birth and genetic intervention before birth,
both being extremely important to the childrearing experience and
therefore, extend protection to genetic engineering in ART.6 2
Contrary to the possible extensiveness of procreative
liberty as a right extrapolated from previous Supreme Court cases
as noted by Fox and Robertson, King suggests that the ruling in
Gonzales expands the State's right to regulate the medical
profession to promote the interest of life possibly even to preSee id.
See id.
See Fox, supranote 21, at 577-79.
58 See id. at 577-78.
59 See id.
60 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
61 See Fox, supra note 21, at 577-79.
62 See
id.
5

56
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embryos outside the uterus.63 In light of Gonzales and in accord
with King's view, Robertson suggests ". . . it is not a stretch to

think that a future Supreme Court majority would allow states to
protect human life from fertilization onward, whether the entity at
stake is inside or outside the body[,]" with the qualification that the
Court "found no other reproductive or liberty rights violated." 64 Of
course only speculation can be made as to the breadth of protection
an individual has to PGD for reproduction under the Constitution
without the Supreme Court addressing that specific question.
II.

GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF PGD

The concept ofjustice gives weight to an ethical analysis of
governmental regulation to ensure "fair, equitable, and appropriate
treatment in light of what is due or owed to persons," within a
society. 65 A government that does not center its foundation on a
free-market distribution of goods and attempts to act equitably
toward prospective parents, might base restrictive regulation of
PGD on a philosophy of distributive justice.66 A government in a
free-market structure, such as the United States, might rely more
heavily on a libertarian theory of justice where individuals' rights
and property are protected to allow PGD to be used to improve
their reproduction and childrearing environment.67 However, an
underlying sense of egalitarian attitudes of justice that provides
fairness to all members of a society might be used to weigh
regulation versus autonomous choice for PGD. It is informative
to see how this difficult question is dealt with on an international
level when trying to make a prediction of how the United States
may regulate PGD.
63

See Jamie King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of

PreimplantationGenetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283,

328 (2008).
64 John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes,
and the Scope of
Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1490, 1497 (2008).
65See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supranote 10, at 226.
66 See id. at 327-28.
67

68

See id. at 337.
See id. at 339-40; see also Fox, supranote 21, at 573.
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A. A Perspective of International Regulation for
PGD
The international landscape of PGD is a hodgepodge of
regulation ranging from absolute bans to negligible intervention.69
As noted by Soini, no specific "international governmental
instruments" exist to regulate PGD other than the advice of
national ethics committees in the forms of recommendations and
reports. 70 Even the European Union is able to skirt the
responsibility of regulating PGD because matters of health policies
belong to the sovereign nations under the EC Treaty.7 ' This leaves
PGD regulation dependant on the suggestions of professional
organizations and the laws of individual nations.
1. International Professional Organizations
It is appropriate to start the analysis of international
regulation of PGD with the "regulation" that holds no legal
authority, hence the term professional organization "guidelines."
The International Bioethics Committee ("IBC") of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO") released a report analyzing the ethical use of PGD
and germ-line intervention in 2003, and came to the following
conclusions, among others: 1) PGD should be limited to medical
uses, 2) PGD testing for normal mental and physical characteristics
should be rejected, and 3) PGD for selecting pre-embryos with
genetic disease or condition similar to a parent is unethical.7 2 In
addition to the UNESCO IBC's guidelines released in 2003, the
Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis International
Society
See S. Soini, PreimplantaitonGenetic Diagnosis (PGD) In Europe: Diversity
ofLegislationa Challengeto the Community and Its Citizens, 26 MED. & L. 309,
317 (2007).
70
See id at 319-20.
71
See id at 321.
72 See UNESCO Int'l Bioethics Comm. [IBC], Reports of the IBC on PreimplantationGeneticDiagnosis andGerm-line Intervention, at 14-15, UNESCO
Doc. SHS-2003/WS/26 (Apr. 24, 2003), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001302/130248e.pdf.
69

98
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("PGDIS") released guidelines for practice in 2004 and the
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology
("ESHRE") released their Best Practice Guidelines in 2005.73
Although Soini claims that Article 4 of the Biomedicine
Convention (1997) provides a "special value" to the guidelines,
there are still questions as to how thoroughly, if at all, these
suggestions and recommendations are actually followed in

practice. 74
2. Individual Nations
a. Strict Ban
Some countries have ended the discussion of PGD within
their borders by banning PGD through legislation. 5 Germany,
Austria and Italy are among the countries that have banned the
76
practice of PGD. Soini points out that although these countries
have banned the use of PGD within their borders, patients can
easily travel to nearby countries with less restrictive regulations to
receive the PGD treatment they want.7 7
b. Restricted Use
Other countries have taken a more moderate approach to
PGD and allow its use with certain limitations.7 8 Countries such as
France, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, the
Netherlands, Australia, and the United Kingdom have allowed
PGD under specific circumstances. 79 France, Denmark and
Norway have passed legislation that allows PGD-Human
Leukocyte Antigen ("PGD-HLA") for tissue typing to match a
7 See Soini, supra note 69, at 320-21.
74
See id. at 321.
7
1See King, supra note 63, at 318; Soini, supranote 69, at 318.
76 See King, supra note 63, at 318; Soini, supra note 69, at 318 (noting that
although a restrictive ban of PGD exists in Germany, the public attitude is more
liberal).
77 See Soini, supra note 69, at 318.
78 See King, supra note 63, at 318; Soini, supranote 69, at 318.
79 See King, supra note 63, at 318; Soini, supra note 69, at 318; C. Thomas,
PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis:Development and Regulation, 25 MED. &
L. 365, 370-71 (2006).
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seriously ill brother or sister.so Japan has not passed legislation
restricting PGD, but the professional organization, the Japanese
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, weighs the social
impact PGD would have on effected groups before issuing a
license to a specific clinic to use PGD.8 The Netherlands will only
allow PGD for "serious conditions." 82 The Australian Medical
Association has guidelines that state PGD should only be used to
prevent permanent diseases.8 3 New Zealand's National Ethics
Committee on Assisted Human Reproduction established
guidelines that leave the decision of PGD not to the family, but
rather to the consensus of genetic counselors and PGD providers in
a case-by-case determination of whether a familial disorder will be
serious in the future child. 84
The United Kingdom ("UK") established the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ("HFEA") to oversee the
use of PGD. A clinic must receive a license from the HFEA to
use PGD. 86 The HFEA lists most of the conditions under which
they will allow PGD on its website.8 7 However, if the HGEA does
not already allow PGD in a situation, a clinic may submit an
application for that specific PGD use.88 Before deciding whether or
not to allow the use of PGD, HFEA will review the application
using scientific, legal, ethical, and medical information.8 9 The
HFEA is continuously changing PGD's acceptable uses as new
See Soini, supra note 69, at 318.
si See King, supra note 63, at 318. King notes that, to date, PGD use in Japan
has been extremely limited.
82 Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
80

83 Id.

Thomas, supra note 79, at 370-71.
See King, supra note 63, at 318.
86 Soini, supra note 69,
at 318.
8
Human
Fertilisation & Embryology
Authority Home Page,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2011).
84

85

88

Id.

89

See Soini, supra note 69, at 318.
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technologies emerge and a greater understanding is reached on
how certain conditions manifest. 90
In 2006, the HFEA changed its policy allowing PGD
screening for non-lethal genes that are linked to cancer risk in
adulthood. 9 1 The HFEA departed from its 2001 policy, limiting
PGD use based on the parents' intentions for the child after birth92
because the House of Lords determined that the HFEA's role is
limited to the extent of pre-embryo selection. 93
B. No Regulation of PGD - The United States
"No Regulation" is a slight misnomer when referring to the
United States because certain agencies have discretion to regulate
aspects of PGD; however, no agencies or statutes have direct
control over the process.94
1. Professional Organizations
Professional organizations such as the American Society of
Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM") and the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology ("SART") have developed guidelines,
and they offer informational services for clinics involved with
PGD.9 5 For example, ASRM ethics committee suggests that PGD
not be used for sex selection unless for preventing a serious sexlinked disease, and ASRM found that PGD was a suitable
substitute for postconception diagnosis and pregnancy
90

See id.; Thomas, supranote 79, at 372-73.

9' Laura Blackburn, U.K. Embryos May be Screenedfor Cancer Risk, 312 Sc.

984 (2006).
92 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 79, at 372-73 (a parent was limited to only
using the child's cord blood for an ill sibling, not bone marrow).
93 id.
94 See Rebecca Dresser, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis as Medical
Innovation: Reflections From The President's Council on Bioethics, 85
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1633, 1634 (2006); Kathy L. Hudson, Preimplantation

Genetic Diagnosis: Public Policy and Public Attitudes, 85 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1638, 1638-39 (2006); King, supra note 63, at 333; Note, Guiding
Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 574, 579
(2006).
95 See King, supra note 63, at 324.
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termination.
However, similar to international professional
organizations, professional organizations within the United States
are voluntary with no legal standing against violators. 97 Although
organizations such as SART can require their members to follow
certain guidelines and procedures, such as being accredited and
filing success rate information, failure to follow SART guidelines
and procedures cannot result in prosecution; the penalty for failure
to abide by SART guidelines is merely a revocation of
membership.98 Membership in these professional organizations, at
least in the United States, is not required to operate ART clinics or
use PGD. 99
2. Federal Agencies
The authority of the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") does not encompass regulating a physician's medical
practices with patients. 00 Although the FDA does have the ability
to regulate devices for efficacy and safety that might be used
during PGD, such as genetic tests, the FDA commonly takes a
"hands off' approach. 101
The Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services ("CMS")
does not have direct authority to regulate any ART or PGD
procedures, but through the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act
("CLIA") CMS has the authority to grant a specialty certification
license required to practice those specialty procedures.' 02
96

Hudson, supra note 94, at 1640.

97 See King, supra note 63, at 325.

See id
See id
100See Dresser, supra note 94, at 1635; Hudson, supra note 94, at 1638-39;
Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, supra note 94, at
579.
101See King, supranote 63, at 335 (noting the majority of genetic test regulation
is left to the CMS because most laboratories were creating their own genetic
tests that were not being commercialized, however, the genetic test landscape is
changing).
102 See id. at
334.
98
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However, CMS has not created a specialty certification for genetic
testing laboratories to hold the genetic testing associated with PGD
to a higher quality standard. 103 CMS does not classify PGD
laboratories as "clinical laboratories" under the CLIA, and
therefore these laboratories do not require a specialty certification
-104
license to practice.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")
under the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act
("FCSRCA") requires IVF providers to report annual success rates
for publication by the CDC. 0 5 Failure by IVF providers to report
annual success rates, however, only results in the minor
punishment of being put on a list of providers who failed to report,
and no further penalty is imposed.106 King comments that under
the current CDC structure for dealing with ART and PGD related
activities, or lack thereof, the CDC has even less authority than
professional organizations. 0 7
III.

ETHICAL ANALYSIS: PARENT'S CHOICE v.
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION

Under what circumstances is it ethical for a parent to use
PGD for procreative purposes? Under what circumstances is it
ethical for a government to prohibit the use of PGD for procreative
purposes? Is one ethical claim greater than the other? Which
principle wins in the ethical balancing act of autonomy versus
justice? This Author submits that not only is there no clear-cut
answer to any of these questions, but in varying circumstances
both autonomy and justice have an equal chance to prevail.
First, an argument for autonomous choice in procreation
will be made. Second, an argument will be made for governmental
regulation based on theories of justice. Finally, two hypothetical
situations, where both scenarios are taken to the extreme, will
'03 Id. at 334-35.

See Hudson, supra note 94, at 1639.
.o.
Id. at 1638.
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Id. at 1638-39.
107 See King, supra note 63, at
334.
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demonstrate how taking either bioethical principle without the
other can never be ethical, with the ethical implications of
everything in between relying on a balance of the two.
A. Argument for a Parent's Choice
Respect for a person's right to make an autonomous choice
is deeply engrained in the ideological foundations of the United
States and further reflected in a line of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. 108 The importance of
autonomous choice in reproduction has a long history supported by
"[1]aws, ethical norms, and institutions [that] protect and support
human desires to have or avoid having offspring, and the rearing
that follows". 109 The Supreme Court recognized in Skinner v.
Oklahoma"0 that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race [,]" and further noted the
importance of reproduction in its discussion of legislation that
would force sterilization of a man convicted two or more times of a
felony as "dealing ... with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man."11 '
A government that decides against regulation of PGD is
attempting to protect the principles of parental autonomy during
reproductive decision-making.11 2 The Government assumes that
the perspective parents are not only capable of acting intentionally
and are not substantially influenced by controlling factors, but also
0 See cases cited supra notes
CHILDRESS, supranote 10, at 57

22, 27, 32, 40, 45; see also BEAUCHAMP &
("Respect for the autonomous choices of other
persons runs as deep in common morality as any principle . . . ."); see generally
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (citing Planned
Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(recognizing prior cases where personal activities and decisions have been
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment)).
109 Robertson, supra note 18, at 451.
110 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
111
1d. at 541.
112 See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer
Babies, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 897, 949 (2007).
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that they are using that capacity to make a well informed and
reasonable choice when deciding to reproduce using PGD.113
Governmental regulation of PGD in the broadest sense could lead
to an arbitrary limitation restricting a parent's most powerful
interests when deciding to have a child. 114 Only in the most
extreme conditions having a direct relation to inequality and
discrimination should governmental regulation play a role in
limiting a parent's autonomous choice in ART involving PGD.
B. Argument for Governmental Regulation
Although under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the Supreme Court has found protection for
autonomous choices involving reproduction, it is clear that this
right, like any other, is not above regulation, as shown in the
infamous eugenics case of Buck v. Bell.' 15 In Buck, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia sterilization law
that enabled the superintendent of certain institutions to force
sterilization of patients. 116 The Virginia Act justified limiting an
autonomous choice to reproduce by stating "that the health of the
patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases
by the sterilization of mental defectives . . ."17 Justice Holmes
rationalized the State's limitation of autonomous choice by
comparing the lives given up by "the best citizens" for the public
welfare versus the "lesser sacrifice" of people such as Carrie
Buck." 8 Buck has yet to be overruled and therefore, as horrific the
thought of forced sterilization may seem, the case serves as a
reminder that under certain circumstances governmental regulation
of our autonomous choices can be held constitutional.1 19
A government that institutes regulation of PGD is
attempting to protect persons already born with disabilities or
113See BEAUCHAMP

& CHILDRESS, supranote 10, at 58-60.
See Robertson, supra note 18, at 450-53.
115 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
116 See id at
207.
114

7

''

1

Id. at 205.

" Id. at 207.
19 See id at 208.
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genetic diseases from increased discrimination and persons unable
to afford PGD from increased inequality.120 Arguments have been
made that "[b]y promoting technologies to avoid the birth of
children with genetic conditions or unwanted traits, we define the
'unfit' in terms of that disability or trait," therefore, increasing
discrimination and inequality toward persons already living with
such conditions.121 Certain circumstances of PGD could call for
governmental regulation because allowing a parent's unregulated
decision could run afoul of an egalitarian society's interest in
decreasing discrimination and inequality.122
C. Hypothetical Situations
1. No Governmental Regulation
A child is born through what was once considered a
"natural" conception. He is born already knowing his flaws and
weaknesses through genetic tests. Stricken with a noticeably below
average stature, receding hair line, non-symmetrical facial features,
and a genetic disease most people thought to be non-existent;
where PGD is the norm, he is shunned by society for his parent's
failure to do what any loving parent would, be tested through PGD
for medical screening and non-medical selection of specific traits.

See Fox, supra note 21, at 584-87. Fox argues that the egalitarian ethos of
compassion towards other members of society must be protected. See id. at 593
("Compassion helps us make sense of the suffering of others, and motivates us
to try to relieve it.").
121 Suter, supra note 112,
at 955.
122 See Fox, supra note 21, at 572; see also THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
120

BIOETHICS,

THE

CHANGING

MORAL

FOCUS

ON

NEWBORN

SCREENING: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS, 77-82 (2008), available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pebe/reports/newbornscreening ("Ifwe test an
infant, not in the hope of providing treatment for his or her condition, but with a
view to making sure that no further children come into the family with the same
defect, are we not in effect telling the child that he or she was, in some ways, a
regrettable mistake . . .").
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2. Strict Governmental Regulation
A child is born with a genetic disease. His parents were
unaware that they were both carriers. He lives a relatively normal
childhood except for the medication, long weekend trips to the
doctor for needed checkups, and the chronic pain he suffers.
Eventually he will learn that his disease drastically shortens his life
expectancy and his chance of passing that disease on to his future
children is relatively high. As a result of their son's birth, both
parents decide that without a way to prevent passing on the
disease, they will not try to have another child.
3. Analysis - How Much Regulation is

Ethical?
Both scenarios demonstrate a hypothetical situation in
which one bioethical principle trumps the other with devastating
consequences. In the first hypothetical situation where there is no
governmental regulation, a parent's choice is completely free from
limitations imposed by the government. As a result, society lacks
compassion towards children born through coital reproduction.123
In a way, not limiting a parent's autonomous choice for PGD could
actually result in the destruction of autonomous procreation.124
Allowing for absolute freedom with PGD will create a genetic
arms race that could foster a sense of social pressure subjecting all
prospective parents to feel a need for PGD in order to have a
"normal" baby. 125 These pressures toward PGD would be a
substantial controlling influence that would take away the selfgovernance of the parent, affecting what once was a parent's
autonomous choice in reproduction by making it no choice at all.
Also, an egalitarian theory of justice requires that a society allow
123See

Fox, supra note 21, at 589-94.
See Suter, supra note 112, at 936-37 ("[T]he aggregate result of individual
choices creates societal and cultural norms which substantially influence or limit
the scope of autonomous decision making in regard to the use of genetic
124

technology." (quoting AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CEJA
REPORT A - A-91: ETHICAL ISSUES IN CARRIER SCREENING OF CYSTIC FIBROSIS
AND OTHER GENETIC DISORDERS, 11 (1991))).
125

See id. at 924-26.
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its members equal opportunity to PGD access, which is unlikely
with no government regulation of PGD procedures in a free-market
economy like the United States. 126 Therefore, no governmental
regulation of PGD would be unethical for violating an egalitarian
theory of justice and ironically limiting a parent's autonomous
choice through social pressures to undergo PGD.
In the second hypothetical situation, a government relying
on principles of justice might eliminate the autonomous choice of
parents wanting to reproduce. As a result, the government's
attempt to discourage the possibility of discrimination and
inequality not only violates autonomous procreation, but conflicts
with other notions of justice.127 Under a libertarian theory of
justice, for instance, regulation of PGD deprives a parent of the
freedom to use their wealth and property in their best interest.128 A
ban on all PGD would be unethical for consequently depriving a
parent of their autonomous choice in reproduction and freedom
under a libertarian theory of justice.
IV. AN ETHICAL SOLUTION
This Author suggests that the best method for regulation of
PGD is a combination of many of the ideas previously discussed.
As this paper demonstrates, the only way to make regulation of
PGD ethical is to balance the interest of the parent's autonomous
choice and the government's interest in justice. To balance these
principles, a system involving a central government agency as well
as more influential professional organizations will be necessary.
A. Government Agency
The government would best be served to institute a separate
agency similar to the HFEA in the UK that is able to handle the

126 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supranote 10, at 233-41.
127 See
id
128

See id
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ever changing field of ART involving PGD, 12 but unlike the
HFEA, this agency would focus on the safety and efficacy of PGD
rather than the appropriate uses.130 The easiest way to provide this
new agency with the power to regulate is to take PGD out of the
private sector through governmental funding.131 Public grants
would force PGD under the umbrella of governmental regulation
and away from the costly private sector through the power of the
purse.132 Once monetary support for PGD is established through
public funding, the government will be able to regulate PGD in
instances where safety and effectiveness of procedures are a
concern.' 3 3 A governmental agency would be an ethical
compromise because parents would be allowed to make
autonomous choices to use a safe and effective means of PGD,
while regulation in the interest of justice would only be instituted
when clear signs of danger to the parent and child were found.
B. Professional Organizations
Professional organizations would have the best opportunity
to account for PGD's ethical considerations and shape a process
for determining its acceptable uses. 134 Through collections of data
from interaction with patient groups, ongoing studies of children
born with PGD, public opinion, and feedback from those already
affected with genetic diseases and disabilities, information can be
gathered and passed on to perspective parents to further broaden
their knowledge of the procedure and all the risk and benefits
associated. The gathered information will reinforce parents'
autonomous choice for PGD with increased self-governance and
See Soini, supranote 69, at 318; Thomas, supranote 79, at 372-73.
See King, supra note 63, at 354; Soini, supra note 69, at 318-19; Guiding
Regulatory Reform in ReproductionandGenetics, supranote 94, at 595-96.
131 See Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, supra note
94, at 589-90.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 595.
134 See Susannah Baruch, PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis and Parental
Preferences:Beyond Deadly Disease,8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245, 26768 (2008).
129
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substantial understanding.135 Therefore, it would be ethical for
professional organizations to make determinations about the
acceptable uses of PGD because the organizations would protect
the autonomous choices of parents while weighing those choices
against signs of increased discrimination and inequality.
CONCLUSION
With advances in technology associated with reproduction
and a better understanding of the interplay of genes in human
development, an increase in the use of PGD for medical screening
and non-medical selection is bound to occur. This Author suggests
that the United States attempt to institute a two tier system for
regulation: 1) a federal agency capable of regulating the
effectiveness and safety of PGD through monetary control, and 2)
an increased influence on clinics to follow ethical guidelines
established by professional organizations working in the field of
ART including PGD. The need for legislatures in the United States
to implement a plan to handle PGD is fast approaching. As
legislatures wrestle with conflicting opinions regarding the use of
PGD, it is imperative that legislators look toward the bioethical
principles of autonomy and justice before making any definitive
decisions. Too little or too much regulation could spell disaster
when one principle, autonomy or justice, is sacrificed in the
interest of the other.
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See id. at 268-69.

